International Law and the Peace Process by Falk, Richard
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 28
Number 3 Spring 2005 Article 2
1-1-2005
International Law and the Peace Process
Richard Falk
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Richard Falk, International Law and the Peace Process, 28 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 331 (2005).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol28/iss3/2
International Law and the Peace Process
By RICHARD FALK*
My analysis of the role of international law in the Israel-Palestine
peace process rests on several fundamental assumptions:
(1)Conventional approaches to resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict,
based on bargaining and inter-governmental negotiations have failed
for several decades, and offer no prospect of succeeding in the
foreseeable future;
(2)International law provides the parties with a perspective on the
merits of their claims in regard to disputed issues, and a crude map that
identifies the contours of a fair solution. Fairness is in the eye of the
beholder, and in such a partisan context as the Israel Palestine conflict,
especially as perceived in the United States, the interpretation of fair is
likely to receive contradictory spins. A way to reduce this spin factor
is to make reference to what features of statehood are necessary for
both Israel and Palestine to constitute viable and secure sovereign
states, as well as to consider Palestinian entitlements under
international law;
(3)Relying on international law is currently as unpromising as the
previously tried approaches because of considerations of political
feasibility; and
(4) If the United States Government were to promote a solution based
on international law, it could show its commitment by taking various
steps that exerted pressure on the government of Israel to implement
international law in the Occupied Territories and in framing future
peace negotiations, including conditioning arms assistance, prohibiting
further foreign investment, and imposing an arms embargo.
In this article I seek to demonstrate that the acceptance of international
law is the best way to achieve peace and security in Israel-Palestine, and
why, despite the potential benefits for both sides, it is highly unlikely -
*This article is based on a paper presented at the conference, "Facts, Rights and Remedies:
Implementing International Law in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," University of California
at Santa Barbara, May 22-23, 2004).
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given current prevailing attitudes toward 'peace' in both Tel Aviv and
Washington - that international law will be used in this manner. Given
such a political reality, I will still proceed to make the argument for using
international law in this context, both to show why past efforts have failed
and how future efforts could succeed if the necessary political will
emerged. In this respect, the assessment is deliberately 'utopian' in the
sense that it is highly unlikely it will be realized in practice. But, as I will
argue, this sort of utopian perspective encourages a more active moral and
political imagination in circumstances where conventional approaches
seem blocked.
Further Framing Remarks
This analysis is premised on the assumption that a sustainable peace
between Israel and Palestine requires the establishment of an independent
state of Palestine enjoying sovereign rights equal to those of the state of
Israel, or in the alternative, a single, bi-national state that treats the new
peoples equally under the authority of a single government. The
indispensable end point to my mind is attaining this sort of equality, but the
two-state approach offers the most likely escape route from the current
impasse. A sustainable peace at the present time is more likely to come
about with the implementation of a two-state system than a shift of
attention to the formation of a single state, which would amount to the
recreation of the historic Palestine as it existed before 1948.1
The focus of this article is to explore the relevance of international law
in getting from here to whichever 'there' of the two mentioned above is
preferred, but is weighted toward an outcome that produces two
independent sovereign states living side by side. This exploration also
seeks to show that the prior exclusion of international law from the peace
process, as has occurred in past efforts to work toward conflict resolution,
inhibits identifying the specific conditions of success and precludes finding
a solution to this tragic conflict. Such a failure is not an abstract matter, as
the persistence and continuous worsening of the conflict is exacting a
terrible toll of human suffering on both peoples, in particular the
Palestinians. In this respect, the continuing exclusion of international law
represents a fatal flaw to the extent that the establishment of a 'peace
process' genuinely seeks to achieve peace rather than merely to register
disparities in power and influence in an agreement that will not command
respect on the Palestinian side, even if accepted at some moment due to
1. For useful overview see Marwan Bishara, Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid:
Occupation, Terrorism and the Future (updated ed., 2001).
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international pressures.2
My work here, as in so much else related to this subject matter, draws
inspiration from my friend, the late Edward Said. While his 'absence' now
deprives us of a needed and irreplaceable voice, his 'presence' persists in
our thoughts and sentiments remaining as powerful as ever for many of us
concerned with this and related issues. In words that express my point of
departure, in a preface published in 2003 for the 25th anniversary edition of
Orientalism, Edward wrote:
Our role is to widen the field of discussion, not to set limits in
accord with the prevailing authority... The paramount thing is that
the struggle for equality in Palestine/Israel should be directed
toward a humane goal, that is, coexistence, and not further
suppression and denial.3
From such a point of departure, the approach developed in this
presentation is rights-based rather than power-driven. The approach is
similar to a persuasive and congenial international law analysis published
five years ago by John Quigley, in his excellent article entitled "The Role
of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli Accommodation," which was part of a
symposium on "The Legal Foundations of Peace and Prosperity in the
Middle East."4 I will go beyond the legal analysis to examine the politics
behind the exclusion of international law. The insistence on the inclusion
of international law may appear as fanciful if we allow our legal
imaginations to be bound by the constraints of present perceptions of
political feasibility. I believe that to find any glimmer of hope for the
future with respect to resolving the conflict, we must be willing to embrace
what now appears implausible. If that political situation could somehow be
changed, then the new format for rights-based negotiations would provide
both Israel and Palestine with a promising framework for achieving a
sustainable solution to the conflict.
II. The Essential Argument
In many circumstances, it would hardly be innovative to propose that
an outstanding international conflict involving sustained political violence
should take account of the respective rights of the parties in seeking to
2. For comprehensive treatment of international law from a Palestinian
perspective see Francis A. Boyle, Palestine, Palestinians, and International Law
(2003).
3. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM, xxiii-xxiv (25th Anniversary ed. 2003) (1994).
4. John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli Accommodation, 31 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351, (1999).
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devise a solution that is fair and sustainable. After all, a major role of
international law is to help parties caught in lethal conflicts to identify,
admittedly without great precision, the outer limits of reasonable claims on
both sides. In this larger sense, it is helpful to understand international law
as the embodiment of reasonableness, and hence to treat gross departures
from international law, unless vindicated by truly exceptional
circumstances, as treading treacherously upon the terrain of
unreasonableness.
It is a sign of the special character of the Israel-Palestine conflict, and
the lengthy history of the failed efforts to find resolution, that it seems like
such a provocative idea to argue that the neglect of international law
guidelines is a fatal flaw of all previous attempts to achieve 'peace'
between these two long-suffering peoples. We must ask, at the outset, why
has this neglect been so ingrained, indeed to such an extent that during the
Oslo years, it was viewed as disruptive of the 'peace process' to contend
that Israel was violating Palestine's rights under international law? If
objection was voiced to Israeli expansion of the settlements, to construction
of bypass roads, and to steps taken to 'Israelize' the city of Jerusalem and
its surroundings, the standard diplomatic response from Tel Aviv and
Washington was to deflect any consideration of the alleged violations of
rights, contending always that such matters would be resolved in the final
status phase of the negotiations. These issues are different in kind from the
Palestinian legal grievances under the occupation, which raise questions
about the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to day-to-day
realities in the West Bank and Gaza. What makes the exclusion of
international law from the peace process itself function so perversely is that
it tends to strengthen the overall position of the party (Israel) that is
pursuing occupation policies deliberately designed to alter the negotiated
outcome via bargaining in its favor? This perversity was accentuated in
2000, at the end of the Camp David II and Taba negotiations when Yasir
Arafat and the Palestinian side were blamed for the breakdown of the
negotiations and the resumption of armed struggle and the Israelis were
praised for their supposedly 'generous' proposals.5 The only conceivable
way such perceptions can achieve even minimal plausibility is by viewing
the 'peace' between the two sides through an Israeli-tinted geopolitical
lens.
5. These proposals were never written down in an authoritative form, and their
content is available only indirectly and tentatively. For a useful commentary see
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, Camp David: A Tragedy of Errors, New York
Review of Books, Aug. 9, 2001, Vol. 48 (No.13).
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What I mean by this comment is that ever since the occupation of the
Palestinian Territories commenced in 1967, Israel has proceeded 'to create
facts on the ground,' especially with respect to the settlements, the status of
Jerusalem, access to and use of water, and the delimitation of borders. It
was these facts, which were themselves gradually established in direct
violation of the ground rules for an occupying power contained in the
Fourth Geneva Convention, that Israel, with American support, managed to
6insert at every stage into the bargaining process. In effect, Israel was
successful in establishing a geopolitically-driven understanding of
'reasonableness,' coupled with an argument as to feasibility, which was
radically at odds with a legally-driven understanding. In effect, Palestinian
demands were deemed 'unreasonable' if they objected to the facts on the
ground in the West Bank (that is, principally, the settlements and their
infrastructure of bypass roads, the denial of a Palestinian right of return,
appropriation of ground water, and the Israelization of Jerusalem). The
Palestinian position was also viewed as impractical to the extent that its
demands were formulated by reference to Palestinian rights under
international law rather than as presented as a negotiating response to an
Israeli proposal. Among other consequences, associating 'peace' with such
geopolitical expectations puts those favoring a balanced and fair outcome
in the position of being identified as 'rejectionists,' or at best, 'unrealistic.'
By his principled opposition to this geopolitical idiom, Edward Said often
found himself categorized as such, and barred from so-called respectable
discussion. On the other side, those who softened their geopolitical
posture, such as Shimon Peres, were misleadingly portrayed as 'doves,'
dedicated to 'peace,' and their views were welcomed as constructive efforts
to bridge the gap and achieve peace.
What made this deformation of negotiations so widely accepted was
the underlying gross imbalance in diplomatic skill and capacity between
the two sides. The stronger Israeli side had an incentive and the ability
both to establish facts that enlarged its claims, with respect to the future,
and to exclude from consideration the invalidating relevance of
international law. Israel has continuously pressed this advantage to the
fullest extent over the entire period of the occupation, which enjoyed, with
minor, rare, and temporary exceptions, unqualified American diplomatic
6. For useful overview see Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western
Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East (2004), esp. 118-151; See
also Stephen Zunes, Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism
(2003), esp. 106-170; on Israeli violations of international humanitarian law, see
Richard Falk, "International Law and the al-Aqsa Intifada," Middle East Report
30(No. 4):16-18 (2000).
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support. This support took the form of blocking, or at the very least,
severely curtailing criticism of these Israeli practices that were so clearly
violative of Palestinian legal rights. Additionally, the American support
infringed upon the sense of fairness and legitimacy of a political process
that sought reconciliation between the two equal peoples. The Palestinian
side was further hampered by a lack of consistent technical competence
about the details of negotiations, a weakness exploited by sophisticated
Israeli negotiators backed by an array of experts. The otherwise puzzling
Palestinian failure to demand the explicit inclusion of international law in
the Oslo framework as pertaining to the process of negotiations from start
tofinish, and as governing Israeli administration of the occupied territories
in the interim is evidence of this particular disparity in negotiating
sophistication. As it was, this weakness resulted in reducing the Palestinian
objections to Israeli gross violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention
during the Oslo period to a barely audible whimper. The Palestinian
leadership, unwisely in my opinion, generally accepted the admonition that
raising legal objections, even in the face of such fundamental alterations in
the status quo as those associated with the billions being invested by Israel
during the 1990s in the settlements and network of roads, would clearly
harm the prospects for progress toward any sustainable peace. These
illegal practices by Israel undercut Tel Aviv's contention that to the extent
that legitimate Palestinian grievances existed, they should be addressed
only later when a final arrangement was being negotiated by the two
parties. The Palestinians were trapped between allowing adverse facts on
the ground to accumulate by way of the expansion of the settlements, land
annexations, and the like and being charged with disruptive behavior with
respect to the peace process by raising objections with respect to issues that
were to be addressed and if possible resolved at the very end of
negotiations, so-called 'final status' issues. This Oslo approach was
defended by the alleged need to first establish security and an end to
violence as Palestinians took over from the IDF in the occupied territory,
and thereby build confidence on the Israeli side that it was safe to go ahead
and deal with the most difficult adjustments for the sake of a durable peace.
In effect, why confront the settlers until the gains for Israel were sufficient
to justify what loomed as an exceedingly difficult struggle. There was a
similar incentive on the Palestinian side relating to relinquishing, or at least
downsizing, the claims of Palestinian refugees and exiles.
At worst, the scale of Israeli settlement construction and infrastructure
development on the West Bank convinced Palestinian skeptics that the
whole Oslo Process was a ruse to undermine growing Palestinian resistance
to the occupation, as well as to make the emergence of a viable Palestinian
[Vol. 28:3
International Law and the Peace Process
state impossible. This skepticism led to a resumption and intensification of
sporadic Palestinian violence, directed especially against the settlers, as a
way of demonstrating that Palestinian militants had not been co-opted into
this geopolitical framing of a one-sided peace. Such a development, in
turn, was seized upon by Israeli extremists, who formed the backbone of
the Likud and never accepted the idea of a negotiated solution, even if
heavily weighted in Israel's favor.7 To these Israeli obstructionists it was
the Palestinians who were using the peace process as a staging ground for
further assaults on Israel's very existence as a state.
In effect, Oslo was destined for failure because its central premise was
based on the embedding of the geopolitical imbalance between the two
sides in an arrangement for negotiations that was identified with 'peace.'
In actuality, it fueled the distinct, yet deeply felt, paranoia of both the
Palestinians and Israelis.
Beyond serving to create facts that would raise Israeli expectations
and change the reference points for a reasonable compromise and a just
outcome, Israeli settlement presents a further problem to the degree to
which international law, as widely and persistently endorsed by the
membership of the United Nations, supports the range of Palestinian claims
pertaining to such issues as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements,
water, and self-determination. The Israeli effort to superimpose its security
and its identity as a Jewish state on the peace process depends on denying
to Palestine the implementation of its rights under international law. On
some of these issues there may be room for a voluntary relinquishment of
legal rights on the part of the Palestinians so as to obtain a political
acceptance in Israel of proposals that will reassure a broad spectrum of
viewpoints in Israel. But to make concessions viable on the Palestinian
side, they must be made in a forthright manner in which Israel
acknowledges by word and deed, and without qualification, the sovereign
equality of any Palestinian entity vis-d-vis itself that is declared in the end
of the process to be a 'Palestinian State.' Such an outcome would almost
certainly also entail the unconditional abandonment on the Palestinian side
of any future additional claims for the rectification of alleged past wrongs,
especially those associated with past expulsions, particularly the refugees
generated by the 1948 and 1967 wars.
So far, this spirit of reciprocity and mutuality has been absent from
even the most widely endorsed peace proposals that enjoy support from
peace activists on both sides. For instance, the 'Geneva Accords' that
7. See Khalidi, supra note 5, at 137-150; see also Derek Gregory, The Colonial
Present (2004), 76-143.
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caused such a stir among peace groups here and elsewhere when released a
few months ago, posits, at best, a Palestinian mini-state that is denied equal
rights, most notably when it comes to the security arrangements permitted
for the two states.8 The outline presented in the Geneva Accords for a
recommended agreement does represent a definite and desirable softening
of the geopolitical imbalance that has marred the official approaches, but it
continues to sustain the illusion that a political bargain between two sides
of unequal leverage can produce a fair and sustainable outcome. The
position that I advocate is that such an outcome can come about only by a
process that, at the very least, acknowledges Palestinian rights under
international law, which means rejecting and removing Israeli 'facts' that
are illegal, and gives substantial expression to these rights as the necessary
basis for defining a fair and just peace. As indicated earlier, there is room
in a peace accord for taking into account deeply and widely felt Israeli
anxieties around Israel's identity as a Jewish state and the related fear of a
massive influx of Palestinian refugees. Allaying this fear would require
some degree of self-limitation on the Palestinian side with respect to the
implementation of their legal rights, perhaps facilitated by compensation
awarded to non-returning Palestinians. In this sense, the insistence on the
relevance of international law should not be confused with a rigid approach
that relies on sterile legalism to resolve the conflict. Of course, admittedly,
drawing the line between taking legal rights seriously and avoiding
legalism depends on interpretative reasonableness on both sides of any
negotiation. When talking with Palestinians who were extremely skeptical
about the Oslo, Geneva, and roadmap frameworks, I was encouraged by the
degree to which there was often a display of flexibility about the literal
enactment of Palestinian rights on the subjects of refugees, borders, even
some settlements, if the context of negotiations was shaped by an ethos of
sovereign equality between the two peoples, but not otherwise.
We need to ask ourselves at this point why, given the relevance of
international law in identifying the contours of a fair and sustainable peace,
it has not been a more prominent negotiating tool for both sides. From a
standard Israeli perspective, the answer is that international law opposes
their demands on the crucial issues, and even if Palestinian rights are not
fully implemented, their mere acknowledgement would still threaten, or be
widely perceived on the Israeli side to threaten the very survival of Israel as
a Jewish state, and at least would seem inimical to Israeli benefits
8. See text of Geneva Accords of Dec. <www.AmericanForce.org/geneva.htm>;
for general considerations see Gregory, supra note 7, at 106-143; Said, supra note 1,
at 282-311.
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associated with the status quo.9 But given the multi-dimensional costs of
the ongoing conflict and the apparent futility and burdens of achieving
security by a combination of oppressive rule and state terrorism, it would
seem that Israel can only hope to achieve security through a peace process
that genuinely satisfies the overwhelming majority of Palestinians, not an
agreement that is force-fed to the Palestinian leadership of questionable
credentials that is reflective of desperate circumstances. I would argue that
this alternative approach, based on the rights of the parties, although never
tested, is the most promising approach, even from an Israeli perspective.
Of course, there would be some large bumps in the road arising from likely
violent disruptive tactics by extremist opponents of such a real peace
process on both sides. The difficulties of following through on the Good
Friday Agreement to resolve conflict in Northern Ireland is illustrative, as
is the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin for his role in promoting the Oslo
framework, even though Oslo never required Israel to abandon the
geopolitical track that gave it an asymmetric advantage."°
I fully acknowledge that a law-guided approach to Israel-Palestine
relations is not politically viable for the foreseeable future, but only
because the political and psychological conditions are absent. An
overwhelming majority of Israelis would presently interpret such an about
face by their government as an unacceptable expression of weakness and
defeat. The shift of approach that I am advocating would require a
dramatic breakdown of the present thinking about Israeli security that
generated such deep pessimism so as to produce receptivity to new
thinking. This could occur either as a result of the persistence of
Palestinian-armed resistance, through a deepening of the Israeli economic
crisis, or by some unexpected change of position by the United States. The
emergence of a charismatic leader in Israel who is willing and able to
produce this sort of reversal of attitudes would also probably be a necessary
component. Such developments, however remote they now seem, are not
altogether inconceivable. Consider the unlikelihood of a peaceful
transformation of apartheid South Africa as late as the mid-1980s or of the
improbable internal and international dynamics set off by the unexpected'
9. There exists a certain affinity to the argument given prominence by Robert Kagen
in his explanation of the cleavage between Europe and the United States with regard to the
role of international law. Kagan contends, in essence, that Europe is disposed toward
international law because it is weak militarily and the United States. is dismissive because it
is strong. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER, AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW
WORLD ORDER (2003).
10. For sharp criticism along these lines see Edward Said, The End of the Peace
Process: Oslo and After (2000).
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leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, which included the
revolutionary calls for glasnost and perestroika.
On the Palestinian side, the reluctance to invoke international law is at
first glance harder to explain. After all, in the encounter with Israel,
international law is one of the few domains in which the Palestinians hold
the better cards. Palestinian legal rights can be invoked both to clarify the
parameters of a fair outcome and as a bargaining tool to neutralize the
power disparity. International law in this context can be understood as a
vast reservoir of latent Palestinian 'soft power,' as yet untested as a lever of
influence. But why untested? Palestinian reluctance to insist on their
rights under international law is most easily explained as a tacit
acknowledgement of extreme and humiliating Palestinian weakness,
accepting the reality that any kind of viable framework for negotiations
would have to conform to even the unreasonable demands of Israel, as
endorsed by the United States government. These demands would include
an insistence that the negotiating process be based essentially on political
bargaining in which the respective legal rights of the parties were not to be
taken into account. Israel has displayed a clear-eyed awareness of the
weakness of their peace diplomacy if it submits to the authority of
international law. In this sense, the exclusion of international law
represents a pre-negotiating Israeli victory that the Palestinians can oppose
only if they are willing to pay a high public relations cost by being cast in
the role of blocking forthcoming peace initiatives.
The Palestinian acceptance of this exclusion is comparable to their
continuing acceptance of the mediating role of the United States in the face
of extreme and consistent displays by Washington of pro-Israeli
partisanship. This strong partisanship has been more or less a constant at
least since 1967, and was epitomized in the months preceding the most
recent American presidential elections by an extraordinary speech given by
President Bush to the 2004 annual meeting of the avidly pro-Israeli
lobbying group, AIPAC. John Kerry also gave gratuitously supportive
statements of Sharon, and his military tactics, promising continuing
unwavering support for Israel if elected. In other words, Palestinian
weakness is so pronounced that these clearly distorting features of so-called
peace negotiations are accepted without public objection by Palestinian
leaders, including Yasir Arafat, despite his ill treatment at the hands of
Israel during the Sharon period.
Because the framework is so grossly distorted and has been so
unproductive, many Palestinians are themselves periodically suspicious
about the motives of their official representatives, exerting their own
pressures through back channels and by continuing militancy. Palestinians
[Vol. 28: 3
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of all people know these elementary truths: that international law and
United Nations authority are on their side and that the United States is
unconditionally committed to Israel and thus not qualified in any sense to
serve as an 'honest broker.' This awareness helps to account for a
Palestinian backlash often directed at their own leadership. It exerts strong
pressures on Arafat and the Palestinian Authority to reassure its people and
their more militant leaders that Palestinian demands have not been, despite
appearances to the contrary, sacrificed. Unfortunately, such reassurances,
when heard by Israelis, feed an impression of double-dealing by Arafat.
While visiting the West Bank and Gaza three years ago as part of a fact
finding mission for the United Nations Human Rights Commission, I recall
being told over and over again by moderate Palestinian civil society
activists that the second intifada of 2000 was intended as much as a
warning to Arafat not to betray fundamental Palestinian claims as it was a
militant reaction to Sharon's visit to Haram al-Sharif (The Temple Mount)
on September 28, 2000. What I am arguing is that the exclusion of
international law, which appears to Palestinians to be tantamount to
political surrender, puts the official Palestinian leadership in a double bind
from which there is no clear way out: they must either reject prospects for a
peaceful solution or participate in a process that ignores their most
fundamental rights.
Having argued along these lines, is it now time to put aside this line of
advocacy as 'utopian,' 'unrealistic,' and a glaring instance of 'the best
being an enemy of the good.' The Palestinians, in particular, have always
been advised by centrist voices in the United States to settle for what they
could get, given the disparity of power between the two sides, as well as
the de facto circumstances brought about by decades of Israeli occupation.
For these reasons, it was implicit that if the Palestinians had any hope for
diplomatic progress, they needed to abandon an insistence on an outcome
based on law and justice. In truth, neither of the parties has ever shown any
interest in a rights-based approach to conflict resolution. Nevertheless, I
think it is essential in the present setting to take this rights-based approach
seriously and to endorse it with avid sincerity. To begin with, I insist that
my position is one in which it is opposing 'the good' to 'the bad' when it
comes to the pursuit of peace, and that the inclusion of international law is
an instance of 'the good' and not of 'the best.' By this I mean a solution
that expects the Palestinians to settle for a non-viable mini-state is 'bad' in
the sense that it will not lead to peace or justice, and providing the
Palestinians with a state that is equal to that of the Israeli may be far from
the 'best' (considering that it is based on ethnic criteria of political
community, which is contrary to the Enlightenment conception of a
20051
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legitimate sovereign state as a secular entity without a specific ethnic or
religious identity) but it might still be 'good' insofar as it ends the conflict
and is a sustainable basis for co-existence of the two peoples. Furthermore,
that which has in the past been hailed as realistic and feasible has not
resulted in any sort of solution in historic Palestine for almost a hundred
years. Put differently, only a solution which seems utopian and unrealistic
at this point can set the political and moral imagination sufficiently free
enough to envision a solution that might finally bring peace. True, for such
thinking 'outside the box' to have any chance at success will still depend
on a sea change in Israeli public opinion and leadership style. Yet we can
affirm that, without this sea change, those outcomes that are touted as
solutions are at best variations of an 'imposed peace.' Such a result is
almost certainly unsustainable, and at worse, a pause in the conflict that
will be ended by an escalated scale of violent encounter.
It might be argued in opposition to my line of thinking that I have
exaggerated the clarity of international law, and the degree to which it
favors Palestinian claims. I make reference to other contributions to the
symposium to bolster this facet of the argument, showing that unlike many
international disputes, here international law as widely understood
throughout the world and as reasonably interpreted, does indeed lend strong
support to the Palestinian position on every major contested issue. This
should not be surprising since Israel has, since its inception, been able to
convert its vulnerability to hostile regional and indigenous forces into a
series of expansions at the expense of the Palestinians. And beyond this,
the Israeli raison d'Otre of being a Jewish state entitled to disallow the
return of Palestinian refugees challenges the widely legitimized view of the
sovereign state as a secular entity that is not permitted to define itself in
exclusivist ethnic and religious terms, and is obliged to treat all of its
inhabitants in a non-discriminatory fashion. To give Jews throughout the
world an unlimited right of return, including those that have resided outside
of present day Israel for centuries, while at the same time disallowing
Palestinians the same right of return, including to their own homes,
illuminates the extreme degree to which the Palestinians have been
victimized and their rights denied at least since 1948. Of course, the
historical realities of the Holocaust, associated patterns of anti-Semitism,
and the anti-Zionist hostility of Arab neighbors must also be taken into
account in assessing the Zionist movement that brought Israel into being as
an independent state. Also relevant is the behavior of the Israeli state that
has, from its inception, fused genuine security concerns with its
expansionist ambitions and schemes. Palestinian sensitivity to some Israeli
concerns, as earlier suggested, might help fashion a valid peace process in a
[Vol. 28: 3
International Law and the Peace Process
spirit of genuine Palestinian accommodation and compromise, but only if a
reciprocal process on the Israeli side yields legal rights to the Palestinians,
including in particular affirming a Palestinian right of self-determination
that included the option of a fully sovereign state.
IlI. Palestinian Claims and International Law
This portion of the paper summarizes the assessments under
international law of the relative merits of the Palestinian claims as to their
legal rights. It concludes that on the politically contested issues of borders,
settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, and water that international law is
generally supportive of Palestinian claims, while being mostly critical of
Israeli efforts to establish facts in contravention of Palestinian legal rights.
Since 1967, Israel, as occupying power in the West Bank and Gaza, has
had an overriding legal responsibility to act as the guardian of the rights of
Palestinians under their control. Their defiant refusal to discharge this
responsibility, including a refusal to comply with numerous resolutions
issued by the United Nations, including the call for an immediate
withdrawal from territory occupied in 1967, validates Palestinian
resistance, although not violence against civilians.11 What counts as a
'civilian' is itself contested, with the issue centering on how to interpret the
status of Israeli settlers, especially those who are armed. Whether
Palestinian exercise of such a right of resistance is prudent and wise under
the circumstances of the conflict remains a contested matter, but from a
legal perspective such a right exists provided that it respects the limits on
political violence embedded in international humanitarian law.
Arguably, a principal motivation for this resistance is the refusal of
Israel to act in accordance with international law or to show respect for the
recommendations and decisions of the United Nations. This refusal has
been allowed, to date, to control the approach to conflict resolution, which
has conveyed to Palestinians, including those seeking some sort of
reasonable compromise, that their only alternatives are political surrender
of their fundamental rights or armed struggle. That is, the failure of the
international community, including the United States, to protect the
11. These issues are fully discussed in Richard Falk & Burns H. Weston, "The
Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In
Legal Defense of the Intifada," 1 HARV. INT'L L.J. 32, 129-155 (1991). A more
cautious approach to these issues can be found in Adam Roberts, "Prolonged
Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967," American Journal
of International Law 84:44 (1990). For discussion of this right of resistance see
Richard Falk, "Asmi Bishara, The Right of Resistance and the Palestinian Ordeal,"
Journal of Palestine Studies XXI (NO.2):19-33 (2002).
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Palestinians from unlawful Israeli policies and practices gives rise to
violent resistance and poisons the peace process itself. There are three
interconnected issues here: international law and the occupation;
international law in the course of the peace process; and international law
and the shape of the final negotiated arrangement.
IV. Toward Peace
As I have argued, the geopolitically oriented approach to conflict
resolution perpetuates the distortions associated with power disparities
between the Israelis and Palestinians, and is incapable of generating
outcomes that are acceptable to the Palestinian side over any length of time.
This underlying assessment should not be put aside because there are also
some differences of viewpoint on the Israeli side. One difference is over
how strongly to insist on translating their geopolitical advantage into a
permanent arrangement, with Israeli 'doves' favoring somewhat less one-
sided solutions than the Israeli 'hawks,' many of whom see no benefit in
making any departure from the de facto realities of Israeli domination of
Palestinian territories.
A further element in understanding this tormented conflict
configuration is the major foundational concession made by the
Palestinians through their acceptance of the 1967 borders as the starting
point for negotiations. As has been frequently pointed out, this Palestinian
initiative concedes 78% of the original Palestine mandate to Israel, limiting
the search for Palestinian self-determination to the remaining 22%.12 In this
respect, even the full implementation of Palestinian rights under
international law would involve an implicit deference to pre-1967 facts on
the ground, that is, geopolitical realities.
Against this background it is possible to envision two different
constructive ways to achieve a sustainable peace, both emphasizing legal
rights but in reverse order. The first approach would start the process of
negotiation from an agreed-upon endpoint of achieving a Palestinian state
in the occupied territories that enjoyed full sovereign rights on an equal
basis with Israel. With this endpoint in view, the peace process would
work backward to determine what steps need to be taken to reach this
outcome. It would seem that steps such as dismantling all armed
12. For instance, Saeb Erakat, the chief Palestinian negotiator with Israel in
recent years, has been quoted as follows: "We recognized Israel in 78 percent of the
territory of Palestine in exchange for our own state on 22 percent, but then Israel
began negotiating over the 22 percent." Michael Jensen, "Palestinians' 'Life in
Precarious These Days,"' JORDAN TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003. See
<http://www.palestinemonitor.org/Feature/cover.htm>.
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settlements, internationalizing the city of Jerusalem, fixing the 1967
borders, establishing a joint regime for sharing water resources, and a
mutual non-aggression pact would be taken according to a fixed timetable.
International law would only be indirectly relevant to help identify what
would need to happen to give Palestine a state that would then provide the
basis for Palestinian self-determination on the basis of equal rights.
International law would also be relevant in establishing a solution to the
burning issue of Palestinian refugees, but as indicated, the solution, while
reflective of legal rights, need not be rigidly legalistic in implementation.
The other alternative would be to shape the process and the outcome
by reference to the respective legal rights and duties of the two sides. Such
a law-guided framework for conflict resolution would apply to the
character of Israeli occupation, requiring strict adherence to the Geneva
framework on International Humanitarian Law during all phases of
negotiation and implementation. International law would also shape the
substantive contours of the Palestinian entity emerging from negotiations.
Such an entity would have to be a state in the full sense of international
law, and could not be subject to Israeli intrusive security arrangements such
as insisting on Palestinian demilitarization or Israeli claims to control air
space, sea corridors, and borders.
A third potential approach noted at the beginning, but outside the
scope of this article, would seek implementation of Palestinian legal rights
within the architecture of a one-state solution, including the process
associated with moving from where we are to the desired endpoint.
In ending I would like to return briefly to the motif of hope as the
necessary alternative to despair. I have been deeply impressed by the
outlook on world affairs of Jacques Derrida, one of the wisest and most
profound thinkers now walking the planet. My presentation can be heard
as an affirmation of the following sentiment expressed by Derrida, thinking
about the future in the light of the 9/11 attacks:
I would take the side of the camp that, in principle, by right of law,
leaves a perspective open to perfectibility in the name of the
'political,' democracy, international law, international
institutions .... Even if this 'in the name of' is still merely an
assertion and a purely verbal commitment. Even in its most cynical
mode, such an assertion lets resonate within it an invincible
promise."
In the same spirit I have tried to give voice to what Derrida calls 'an
13. GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH
JORGEN HABERMAS AND JAcQUEs DERRIDA 114 (2003).
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invincible promise' as one way to sustain hope amid darkness.
In this search for the difficult and obscure road forward a few lines
of poetry by Mahmoud Darwish from the poem "The Hoopoe" provide a
form of subtle encouragement:
Our journey to oblivion has been endlessly prolonged.
The veil before us obscures every other veil. Maybe
traveling half the road will lead us to a road of clouds.
Perhaps, 0 hoopoe of mysteries, we are nothing but
ghosts searching for ruins.
For what use is our thought if not for mankind?"14
Epilogue
Since this article was drafted, some possibly momentous
developments have altered the climate of opinion on Israel/Palestine
relations. Yasir Arafat is dead. His elected successor, Mahmood
Abbas as of early 2005, has met with Ariel Sharon, a ceasefire has
been negotiated at Sharm Al Shaik, with Israeli promises of a
complete disengagement from Gaza and substantial withdrawals of
military forces from West Bank cities, as well as a general softening
of the oppressive features of the occupation. Abbas has renounced
the tactic of armed struggle, deployed Palestinian Authority Security
Forces with orders to prevent violence against Israeli targets, and has
removed from command those security officers who have opposed his
approach. Abbas has also been attempting to persuade Hamas and
militant factions to join in the observance of a ceasefire, and seek
their goals within the political process. Additionally, George W.
Bush has been reelected President, and has reaffirmed the support of
the United States for the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian
State.
Do these developments constitute a new beginning in the search
for a genuine peace or is this more smoke and mirrors intended to
hide an unyielding structure of American-backed Israeli domination?
There have been other moments of hope in the mainstream, none
more widely felt than at the start of the Oslo 'peace process." An
then again in 2000, when Bill Clinton, in the last months of his
presidency, pushed hard at Camp David and Taba to achieve a
breakthrough toward peace. As of now, it still appears that Prime
14. MAHMOUD DARWISH, UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS PARADISE 40, 48 (Munir Akash et
al. eds. & trans., 2003).
[Vol. 28:3
International Law and the Peace Process
Minister Sharon wants to keep most Israeli settlements, and to deny
more than half of the West Bank to any Palestinian entity that might
emerge from negotiations.1 5 If this is a correct reading of Sharon's
maximal offer to the Palestinians, then the pause in the armed
struggle does little more than to delegate the burdens of occupation to
the Palestinians with a mandate to kill other Palestinians who wage an
ongoing struggle on behalf of their right to self-determination. What
is also discouraging, are indications that settlement building is
continuing at a rapid rate, that land in the Jerusalem area continues to
be taken from Palestinian owners, and that Israel is going ahead with
the building of its security wall at great expense and in defiance of the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice backed by
fourteen or fifteen judges.
In other words, the rhetoric and the surface mood has changed for
the better, and quite possibly the daily existence of the Palestinians
living under occupation will improve at least temporarily. It is
encouraging in this regard that Israel seems to have stopped house
demolitions as retaliatory acts.16 At the same time, the underlying
structure of occupation is being maintained intact, defiance of
fundamental Palestinian rights persists, and the Israeli concept of
'peace' remains far too one-sided to be acceptable to most
Palestinians and therefore unlikely to be sustainable even in the event
that the current Palestinian leadership were to swallow some new
offer. At this point, there remains in existence a deeply flawed 'peace
process' and the basic argument of my assessment does not have to be
modified in light of recent developments. What we are likely
experiencing may turn out to be nothing more than the less-violent
phase of a cycle that alternates every few years between and
atmosphere of hopes raised and one of hopes dashed. We can only
work to have this cycle broken by the realization that until Palestinian
rights are respected there will be no prospect of peace, and at best,
periodic ceasefires in an unresolved struggle.
As usual, the pessimists argue that what is happening is just a
repetition of a dispiriting pretense, while the optimists are insisting
that this is a new and promising beginning that deserves support from
persons of good will. It seems best to withhold judgment, and hope
15 See Henry Siegman, Sharon and the Future of Palestine, New York Review of
Books, 51 (No. 19): 7-14, Dec. 2, 2004.
16 See Greg Myre, Israel Halts Decades-Old Practice of Demolishing Militants'
Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, A1-A3.
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that reason and a sense of justice on both sides will begin to prevail at
last.
